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JOE CAMEL VERSUS UNCLE SAM:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GRAPHIC
CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS
B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr.*
According to the Surgeon General, tobacco use is the leading
preventable cause of death in the United States. Smoking-related diseases
kill 443,000 Americans each year, more than are killed by HIV, illegal drug
use, alcohol use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides, and murders combined.
To address this public health threat, Congress enacted the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in 2009, which gave the federal
government unprecedented power to regulate the tobacco industry. Among
its provisions, the TCA requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to
select images that depict smoking’s deleterious effects and compels tobacco
companies to display the images, accompanied by a textual warning, on
half of the front and rear panels of every cigarette package. This new
graphic format—the first alteration of cigarette package warnings in over
twenty-five years—represents a significant and aggressive change in the
way that the government communicates the dangers of smoking to the
public.
To prevent the introduction of these new labels into the marketplace, the
tobacco industry has filed suit alleging that the graphic warnings infringe
on its First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. The two circuit
courts that have considered this issue are divided sharply over the labels’
constitutionality and the appropriate framework for assessing them. This
Note examines this legal fissure and argues that the warnings should be
examined under the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review. Ultimately,
this Note contends that the labels do not pass muster under this intense
level of scrutiny and are thus unconstitutional compulsions of speech.
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University. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Professor Elizabeth Cooper, for her incisive
feedback and unwavering enthusiasm throughout this process. Thank you, too, to Professors
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“To cease smoking is the easiest thing I ever did. I ought to know
because I’ve done it a thousand times.”1

INTRODUCTION
In the convenience store, the cigarette packages are in their usual location
behind the counter. A smoker, you approach the cashier and ask for your
brand of choice. She passes you a pack, which you take without much
thought. In your hands it feels like it always has, the same familiar size and
weight. But as you fetch your wallet to pay for it, something about its label
catches your eye: it is significantly different than what you have grown
accustomed to. The name and logo of the brand are still there, but covering
half of the package is a color photo of a man smoking a cigarette through a
hole in his throat. Accompanying this disturbing image are the words
“WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive.” Surprised, you strain to see the
other packages behind the counter; they too, you notice, follow this new
labeling scheme. You look back down at the package and for a few beats
consider the gruesome image and its textual admonition. You are now
faced with a choice: do you buy the cigarettes and eventually smoke them,
or do you leave the package at the counter and exit the store?
Consumers of cigarettes in the United States may soon be asking
themselves this and similar questions as a result of the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act2 (TCA). Among its provisions, the
1. See READER’S DIG., Dec. 1945, at 26 (attributing the quotation to Mark Twain); see
also Bayard T. Horton, The Outlook in Thrombo-Angiitis Obliterans, 111 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2184, 2188 (1938) (same). The origin of this quotation is disputed.
2. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15,
and 21 U.S.C.).
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TCA requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to select
images that depict smoking’s deleterious effects and compels tobacco
companies to display the images, accompanied by a textual warning, on half
of the front and rear panels of every cigarette package.3 This new graphic
format, the first alteration of cigarette package warnings in over twenty-five
years,4 represents a significant and aggressive change in the way that the
government communicates the dangers of smoking to the public.
To prevent the introduction of these new labels into the marketplace, the
tobacco industry has filed suit in two federal courts, alleging that the
graphic warnings infringe on its First Amendment right to refrain from
speaking. Consequently, the rollout of the new labels, originally slated for
September 2012,5 is now uncertain. In limbo, too, is the appropriate
framework for assessing the constitutionality of this regulation and the
extent to which the government can warn the public about the dangers of
smoking and other activities deemed harmful or unhealthy.
In 2012, two circuits considered this issue and divided sharply over the
labels’ constitutionality and the appropriate framework for assessing them.
The Sixth Circuit determined that the labels were subject to strict scrutiny
unless an exemption—namely, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, providing for rational basis
review of disclosures meant to correct potentially misleading commercial
speech6—applied.7 The court found that, because the labels disclose factual
information, such an exemption did apply.8 The court then reviewed the
labeling requirement using the Zauderer rational basis standard and found
that the provision satisfied this test.9 For this reason, the Sixth Circuit held
that the labeling requirement did not violate the First Amendment.10
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit determined that the labels were subject to
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Service Commission11 unless the Zauderer exception applied.12 The court
found that the labels did not correct potentially misleading speech and thus
After examining the images using
found Zauderer inapplicable.13
intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the labels did not satisfy this

3. See id. § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333); see also infra Part I.A.2–3.
4. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (noting that Congress last altered
cigarette warning labels in 1984).
5. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,628 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Final Rule] (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141)
(“This rule is effective September 22, 2012.”).
6. 471 U.S. 626 (1985); see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing the Zauderer standard).
7. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
8. See id. at 558.
9. See id. at 561–69.
10. See id. at 569.
11. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also infra Part I.B.3 (detailing the Central Hudson
standard).
12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
13. See id. at 1215–17.
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standard.14 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that the labels violated the
First Amendment.15
Adding to the confusion, although each circuit court upheld the judgment
of its respective trial court,16 each employed a different level of scrutiny
than its district court.17 Further, neither circuit court decision was
unanimous.18
This Note analyzes this legal fissure. It focuses on identifying and
applying the appropriate framework for assessing the graphic warning
labels’ constitutional fitness. It concludes that the warnings should be
examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies.
Moreover, it argues that the graphic warning labels do not correct
potentially misleading speech as defined by Zauderer and its progeny, that
Zauderer does not apply, and that strict scrutiny does. This Note concludes
that, under this intense level of scrutiny, the cigarette labels proposed by the
FDA do not pass muster and are therefore unconstitutional compulsions of
speech.
Part I of this Note first examines the federal government’s attempts to
educate the public about smoking through package warning labels and then
reviews the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence. Part II describes
the different frameworks that the Sixth and D.C. Circuits and the district
courts used to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and the
application of their chosen scrutiny. Part III contends that strict scrutiny
should apply unless Zauderer does, that Zauderer does not apply and thus
strict scrutiny does, and that the regulation is unconstitutional when
subjected to this review.
I. CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS AND THE RIGHT (NOT) TO SPEAK
The litigation over the TCA’s labeling requirement sits at the intersection
of public health policy and freedom of expression. In order to fully
appreciate the split in the circuit courts, it is necessary to understand the
government’s history of requiring warning labels on cigarette packages, the
new format mandated by the TCA, and the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. Accordingly, this part sets forth this context,
with Part I.A tracing the government’s attempts to educate consumers about
14. See id. at 1217–22.
15. See id. at 1221–22.
16. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Western District of Kentucky’s opinion in
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010)); infra
Part II.B.1 (examining the District Court for the District of Columbia’s judgment in R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012)).
17. The court in Commonwealth Brands used the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
standard to analyze the provision’s First Amendment constitutionality. See infra notes 248–
50 and accompanying text. The district court in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco examined the
provision under strict scrutiny. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II.A.2–3 (detailing the majority and dissenting opinions in the Sixth
Circuit decision); infra Part II.B.2–3 (exploring the majority and dissenting opinions in the
D.C. Circuit judgment).
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the health consequences of smoking through warning labels on cigarette
packages, the TCA’s graphic warning labeling requirement, and the FDA’s
implementation of that provision. Part I.B surveys the speech—and
silence—that the First Amendment protects, focusing in particular on the
Supreme Court’s compelled and commercial speech doctrines and its
treatment of factual disclosures.
A. Cigarette Warning Labels: The Government Attempts To Inform the
Public About the Dangers of Smoking
The adverse effects of cigarette smoking are considerable.19 According
to the Surgeon General, tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of
death in the United States.20 Smoking-related diseases21 kill 443,000
Americans each year,22 more than are killed by HIV, illegal drug use,
alcohol use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides, and murders combined.23 The
economic losses stemming from tobacco use are also staggering: in the
United States alone, smoking accounts annually for over $193 billion in lost
productivity and health care expenditures.24 These considerable health and
financial costs contrast with the billions of dollars in profits made each year

19. The Surgeon General has concluded that “[s]moking harms nearly every organ of the
body, causing many diseases and reducing the health of smokers in general.” See U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 25 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2004/complete_report/index.htm (click on
“Chapter 1”); see also Smoking & Tobacco Use: Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_
sheets/health_effects/effects_cig_smoking/index.htm (last updated Jan. 10, 2012).
20. See 2004 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 30.
21. Cigarette smoking is causally linked with twenty-nine medical conditions, such as
coronary heart disease and at least ten types of cancers. See, e.g., id. at 4–8 tbl.1.1; Smoking
& Tobacco Use, supra note 19.
22. Smoking-related diseases cause nearly one of every five deaths in the United States.
See Smoking & Tobacco Use, supra note 19; see also Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years
of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1226, 1226–28 (2008) (categorizing the 443,000 annual smokingrelated deaths by cause). This figure includes those affected indirectly by smoking, such as
victims of secondhand exposure to tobacco smoke. See id.
23. See Smoking & Tobacco Use, supra note 19.
24. During 2000–2004, cigarette smoking was estimated to be responsible for nearly $96
billion in direct medical costs and an additional $97 billion in lost productivity, a total of
$193 billion. See Smoking & Tobacco Use: Economic Facts About U.S. Tobacco Production
and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_
statistics/fact_sheets/economics/econ_facts/index.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2012).
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by the tobacco industry25 and the billions of dollars spent by that industry
annually on advertising and other promotions.26
To address this public health threat and to counteract the tobacco
industry’s financial and advertising strength, the federal government has
implemented a number of regulatory and legislative initiatives, including
mandating the placement of warning labels on every pack of cigarettes.
This section outlines the history of the government’s response, the TCA’s
graphic labeling scheme, and the images chosen by the FDA to appear on
future cigarette labels.
1. Like “Bringing a Butter Knife to a Gun Fight”27: Cigarette Warning
Labels Before the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Although physicians had suspected a connection between smoking and
disease for centuries,28 the first medical studies confirming that link did not
appear until the 1920s.29 In the years following these initial studies,
thousands of laboratory, autopsy, and epidemiologic studies examined the
relationship between tobacco use and disease.30 With the evidence
mounting, the Surgeon General convened an advisory committee to
examine the issue in 1962.31 The committee’s report, issued in 1964,
concluded that cigarette smoking caused disease32 and death.33 In response,
25. Altria Group, the parent company of Philip Morris USA, the United States’ largest
tobacco company, reported earnings of almost $3.6 billion in 2011. See ALTRIA 2011
ANNUAL REPORT 92 (2011), available at https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/02209S/
20120323/AR_120342/. The top six global tobacco companies made an estimated $500
billion in revenues and $35.1 billion in profits in 2011. See Simon Bowers, Global Profits
for Tobacco Trade Total $35bn As Smoking Deaths Top 6 Million, GUARDIAN (March 21,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/22/tobacco-profits-deaths-6-million.
26. In 2006, cigarette companies spent $12.4 billion on advertising and promotional
expenses in the United States alone. See Smoking & Tobacco Use: Tobacco Industry
Marketing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_
statistics/fact_sheets/tobacco_industry/marketing/index.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).
27. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[The]
FDA lament[s] that their previous efforts to combat the tobacco companies’ advertising
campaigns have been like bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.”).
28. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 5 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], available at http://profiles
.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBXS.pdf; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
513–15 (1992) (summarizing the early scientific research on tobacco and the government’s
initial responses to educating the public of the ill-effects of its use).
29. See, e.g., A.C. Broders, Squamous-Cell Epithelioma of the Lip: A Study of Five
Hundred and Thirty-Seven Cases, 74 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 656 (1920) (linking tobacco use to
lip cancer); Herbert Lombard & Carl Doering, Cancer Studies in Massachusetts: Habits,
Characteristics and Environment of Individuals with and Without Cancer, 198 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 481, 485–87 (1928) (noting that heavy smoking was more common among cancer
patients than among control groups).
30. See generally 1989 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 28.
31. See id. at 6.
32. See id. at 7.
33. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
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the Surgeon General declared cigarette smoking to be a significant health
hazard in need of immediate attention.34
Reacting to the Surgeon General’s findings, Congress enacted the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act35 (FCLAA) in 1965.36 The
FCLAA gave the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate
cigarette labels37 and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the
authority to regulate tobacco advertising on radio and television.38 The new
law also delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to regulate other aspect of the tobacco
industry.39 Finally, the FCLAA required tobacco companies to display a
textual warning in “a conspicuous place” on all cigarette packages starting
in 1966.40 This warning read: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health.”41 With the introduction of this warning, the
United States became the first country to mandate a warning label on
cigarette packages.42
Since the appearance of this initial warning in 1966, Congress has twice
modified the wording of the required warning. In 1970, the Public Health
HEALTH SERVICE 31 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf
(“In view of the continuing and mounting evidence from many sources, it is the judgment of
the Committee that cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain
specific diseases and to the overall death rate.”).
34. See id. at 33 (“Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the
United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.” (emphasis omitted)).
35. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1341 (2006)); see also President Signs Cigarettes Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1965, at 17
(reporting on President Lyndon Johnson’s signing of the FCLAA).
36. Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938. See
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399
(2006)). The FDCA authorized the FDA to regulate food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. See
21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006) (establishing the contours of the FDA’s authority by clearly
identifying food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices as subject to FDA regulation). Tobacco
products were not included in this original grant of authority. See id. In 1965, the House
passed, and later withdrew, a bill that would have placed tobacco within the FDA’s
regulatory jurisdiction by expanding the FDCA. See Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not
Regulate Tobacco Products As “Drugs” or As “Medical Devices,” 47 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1079
(1998). Professor Richard A. Merrill characterizes this withdrawal and the subsequent
passage of the FCLAA as a congressional “compromise,” a “‘deal’ struck in Congress” that
excluded the FDA “from any role in federal [decision making] about the health effects of
tobacco use.” Id. at 1079–80.
37. See FCLAA § 5.
38. See Jennifer Costello, Comment, The FDA’s Struggle To Regulate Tobacco, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 671, 677 n.32 (1997) (explaining the FCC’s initial regulatory role).
39. See id. at 678 n.42 (describing the IRS’s role in taxing tobacco sales, the USDA’s
regulation of tobacco farming, and the ATF’s task of fighting illegal tobacco sales and
distribution).
40. See FCLAA § 4. The FCLAA did not specify the size, color, or position of the
warning on package, leaving these details to the discretion of the cigarette industry. See
President Signs Cigarettes Bill, supra note 35.
41. See FCLAA § 4.
42. See Duff Wilson, U.S. Selects Cigarette Warning Images, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2011, at B1 (noting this milestone).
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Cigarette Smoking Act43 (PHCSA) amended the warning to include an
admonition from the Surgeon General and stronger language: “Warning:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is
Dangerous to Your Health.”44 In 1984, the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act45 (CSEA) introduced four new warnings to be placed on all
tobacco products and to be rotated on a quarterly basis for each brand.46
These warnings are:
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy”
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight”
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:
Carbon Monoxide.”47

Cigarette Smoke Contains

These 1984 warnings remain emblazoned on cigarette packages and were to
be modified by the TCA’s graphic labels.48
2. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Since the introduction of warnings labels on cigarette packages in 1965,
the rate of smoking among adults in America has decreased from
approximately 42 percent49 to approximately 19 percent in 2011,50 due in
large part to the increasing awareness that cigarette smoking is harmful.51
43. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1340 (2006)).
44. See id. § 4. The PHCSA also banned television and radio advertisements for tobacco
products. See id. § 6.
45. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331–1340 (2006)).
46. Id. § 4(c). See generally Ronald M. Davis et al., The Rotation of Health Warnings in
Cigarette Advertisements: Compliance with the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of
1984, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 403 (1988) (describing the warning label rotation system
introduced by the CSEA and its increased efficacy).
47. CSEA § 4.
48. Kristin M. Sempeles, Note, The FDA’s Attempt To Scare the Smoke Out of You:
Has the FDA Gone Too Far with the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PENN ST. L.
REV. 223, 223 n.3 (2012); see also Gary Strauss, Graphic Cigarette Labels, Will They
Work?, USA TODAY (June 22, 2011, 12:58 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
health/story/health/story/2011/06/FDA-issues-graphic-cigarette-labels/48676990/1 (noting
that “[t]he images are the biggest change to cigarette warning labels since 1984”).
49. See Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2006, 56 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1157, 1161 fig.1 (2007) (illustrating the smoking prevalence rate
among adults in the United States between 1965 and 2006).
50. See Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2011, 61 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 889, 892 (2012).
51. In addition to increased awareness of smoking’s health consequences, smoke-free
buildings, price increases by tobacco companies, and excise taxes have also played a role in
decreasing the prevalence of smoking. See Dennis Cauchon, Tax Hike Cuts Tobacco
Consumption, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/
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Recently, however, this downward trend has leveled off, hovering around
20 percent for the past five years.52 Among other reasons, this can be
attributed to two factors. First, each day thousands of young people try
cigarettes for the first time and many become regular smokers.53 Second,
research indicates that the textual labels are ineffective54 because they are
easily overlooked55 and require a college reading level, thus making them
inappropriate for youth, those with poor reading abilities and low levels of
education, and non-English speakers.56
On June 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the TCA,57
the most sweeping federal tobacco legislation in over twenty-five years.58
Rebutting Congress’s original denial of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco
regulation and the Agency’s unsuccessful attempt to regulate tobacco

story/2012-09-10/cigarette-tax-smoking/57737774/1 (reporting that a 22 percent increase of
the federal cigarette tax in 2009 led three million people to stop smoking in 2010 and
mentioning other possible causes for the decrease). See generally Serginio Sylvain, The
Effects of Excise Tax on Cigarette Consumption: A Divergence in the Behavior of Youth and
Adults, 1 MICH. J. BUS. 87 (2008) (arguing that the percentage of adult smokers does not
change with taxation whereas the percentage of underage smokers decreases significantly
when excise taxes on cigarettes increase).
52. See Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2011, supra note 50,
at 889–94.
53. The government estimates that 4,000 young people between the ages twelve and
seventeen try their first cigarette each day. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
TOBACCO USE AND THE HEALTH OF YOUNG PEOPLE (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
HealthyYouth/tobacco/pdf/tobacco_factsheet.pdf.
54. See generally Bethany K. Dumas, Adequacy of Cigarette Package Warnings: An
Analysis of the Adequacy of Federally Mandated Cigarette Package Warnings, 59 TENN. L.
REV. 261 (1992) (analyzing the linguistic and psychological effect of the rotational textual
warnings and questioning their adequacy and effectiveness). But see Davis et al., supra note
46 (examining the increased efficacy that resulted from the introduction of the CSEA’s
labeling regime).
55. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (2007) [hereinafter INST. OF MED. REPORT], available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11795 (reporting that since the introduction of
the 1984 warning labels, “evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of the prescribed warnings
has continued to accumulate,” supporting the conclusion that these warnings “are unnoticed
and stale, and they fail to convey relevant information in an effective way”); U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH & TOBACCO: PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 167–69 (1995), available at
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCLQ.pdf (detailing the numerous empirical studies
regarding the ineffectiveness of warning labels and concluding that these studies show that
the 1984 labels are easily overlooked).
56. INST. OF MED. REPORT, supra note 55, at 437.
57. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15,
and 21 U.S.C.); see also Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15 (discussing President Barack Obama’s signing of the TCA into
law and his smoking habit).
58. See Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2009, at A1 (characterizing the TCA as “the first big federal step against smoking
since the 1971 ban against tobacco advertising on television and radio and the 1988 rules
against smoking on airline flights—but potentially much more sweeping than either of those
moves”).
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products in 1996,59 the TCA gives the FDA exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the tobacco industry.60 In exchange, however, the TCA prohibits
the FDA from banning the sale of tobacco or mandating the elimination of
nicotine from cigarettes.61 Among other provisions, the TCA affects the
ability of tobacco companies to sell and market their products.62 These
limitations include restricting the marketing of “modified risk tobacco
products,”63 outlawing claims that a tobacco product is safe or safer as a
result of FDA regulation;64 prohibiting color and imagery in tobacco

59. In 1996, the FDA unsuccessfully attempted to regulate the tobacco products under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). See Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,
61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,615–18 (Aug. 28, 1996). The FDCA prohibits any misbranded
food, drug, or device from entering into interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
After extensive fact-finding, the FDA determined that nicotine was a “drug” and cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco were “devices” that deliver nicotine to the body within the meaning
of the FDCA, and thus tobacco products were within its regulatory purview. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(h)(2)–(3) (defining a “device” as having an “intended” effect on the structure or
function of the body or an “intended” use in the cure or prevention of disease). Tobacco
companies objected, and the Supreme Court addressed the issue in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Applying the two-step executive statutory
interpretation test introduced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court held that the FDA’s attempted regulation exceeded its
authority. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132–33.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (Supp. V 2011).
61. Id. § 387g(d)(3) (restricting the FDA’s authority to reduce nicotine levels to zero or
to ban tobacco products).
62. The TCA’s advertising and marketing provisions may address the perceived
shortcomings of the $206 billion “master settlement” agreement reached between seven
tobacco companies and forty-six states in 1998. See Wilson, supra note 58. That agreement
resolved lawsuits and banned a number of the industry’s marketing practices, including the
use of cartoons in advertisements and advertising on billboards and public transportation, in
sports stadiums, shopping malls, and video game arcades. See Master Settlement Agreement,
NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., § III(b)–(d) (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.naag.org/backpages/
naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf. In the
years since the settlement’s signing and the implementation of these industry-imposed
sanctions, tobacco companies have nearly doubled their marketing spending and increased
their advertising in stores, an advertising space not addressed by the agreement. See Wilson,
supra note 58.
63. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101(b), 123 Stat. 1776, 1784 (2009) (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.) (amending the FDCA to add § 911(b)(2)(A)) (prohibiting
(1) “the label, labeling, or advertising” of a tobacco product from “explicitly or implicitly”
suggesting that the product is less harmful than other tobacco products, and (2) a “tobacco
product manufacturer” from taking “any action directed to consumers through the media or
otherwise . . . respecting the product that would be reasonably expected to result in
consumers believing that the tobacco product or its smoke may” be less harmful than other
tobacco products, without prior FDA approval of the product as “modified risk”).
64. See id. §§ 103(b), 301(tt) (amending the FDCA to add § 331(tt)) (prohibiting
tobacco companies from making “any express or implied statement or representation
directed to consumers . . . through the media or advertising” that “conveys, or misleads or
would mislead consumers into believing, that (1) the product is approved by the [FDA];
(2) the [FDA] deems the product to be safe for use by consumers; (3) the product is endorsed
by the [FDA] for use by consumers; or (4) the product is safe or less harmful by virtue of
[either] its regulation or inspection by the [FDA]; or its compliance with regulatory
requirements set by the [FDA]”).
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advertising;65 and banning event sponsorship,66 the branding of nontobacco
merchandise,67 and the distribution of free sample cigarettes.68
The TCA also mandates a new, three-element warning label that replaces
the previous labeling format. First, the TCA requires all cigarette packages
to bear one of the following nine textual warnings:
“Cigarettes are addictive”
“Tobacco smoke can harm your children”
“Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease”
“Cigarettes cause cancer”
“Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease”
“Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby”
“Smoking can kill you”
“Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers”
“Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health.”69

Second, the TCA specifies that the labels “shall comprise the top 50 percent
of the front and rear panels of the package” and that the word “WARNING”
should appear in capital letters in seventeen-point font.70 Third, the TCA
requires “color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of
smoking” to accompany the textual warnings.71 The FDA states that the
purpose of these new graphic labels is to convey information about the

65. Section 102(a)(2) requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
promulgate a regulation that “shall be identical in its provisions to part 897 of the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary . . . in the August 28, 1996, issue of the Federal Register (61
Fed. Reg. 44,615–18).” Id. § 102(a)(2). Section 897.32(a) of those regulations prohibits
every “manufacturer, distributor, and retailer” of tobacco products from “advertising, . . .
disseminating or causing to be disseminated, any labeling or advertising for cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco” unless such labeling or advertising consists of “only black text on a
white background.” 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617, § 897.32(a) (Aug. 28, 1996).
66. See TCA § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,615–18, § 897.34(c)) (prohibiting
any “manufacturer, distributor, or retailer” of tobacco products from “sponsor[ing] or
caus[ing] to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or
any entry or team in any event, in the brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message,
recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical
or similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco”)).
67. See id. § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617, § 897.34(a)) (prohibiting any
manufacturer of tobacco products from marketing, distributing, or selling any promotional
item bearing the “brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message, [or] recognizable
color or pattern of colors” of any tobacco product brand)).
68. See id. § 102(a)(1), (a)(2)(G) (adopting and amending 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616–17,
§ 897.16(d)) (prohibiting any “manufacturer, distributor, or retailer” of “cigarettes,
smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products” from “distribut[ing] or caus[ing] to be
distributed any free samples of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco.”)).
69. Id. § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).
70. See id.
71. See id.
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negative health consequences of smoking to consumers and to decrease
smoking rates.72
3. The FDA Selects the Nine Images
Pursuant to the TCA, the FDA issued a proposed rule on November 12,
201073 and sought comment on thirty-six potential images to accompany
the nine textual warnings.74 During the comment period that followed, the
FDA received, reviewed, and responded to over 1,700 comments.75 Also,
the FDA commissioned an 18,000-person, internet-based consumer study to
research the efficacy of the thirty-six proposed images.76 Finally, the FDA
considered empirical evidence from research studies that explored the
efficacy of the graphic warning labels already in place in Australia and
Canada.77 Based on this evidence, the FDA selected nine images and
promulgated a final rule on June 22, 2011.78
The graphics chosen by the FDA to appear on cigarette labeling include
photos of (1) a man smoking a cigarette through a tracheotomy;
(2) diseased lungs; (3) a mouth with stained teeth and an open sore; (4) a
cadaver with chest staples laying on an autopsy table; (5) a woman crying;
(6) a man wearing a T-shirt with the words “I Quit” on it; (7) a baby and an
adult, presumably a parent, surrounded by curling cigarette smoke; (8) a
patient hooked up to an oxygen mask; and (9) a drawing of a crying
newborn in an incubator.79 Additionally, the final rule requires the new

72. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,633 (discussing the “primary goal” of the larger,
graphic warnings in response to a comment questioning the new labeling format’s efficacy).
73. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg.
69,524, 69,534 (Nov. 12, 2010).
74. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,636.
75. See id.
76. This FDA-sponsored study “quantitatively examined the relative efficacy of the 36
proposed color graphic images in communicating the harms of smoking.” Id. at 36,637. The
D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco described the setup of this study succinctly:
The study divided respondents into two groups: a control group that was shown
the new text in the format of the current warnings (located on the side of cigarette
packages), and a separate treatment group that was shown the proposed graphic
warnings, which included the new text, the accompanying graphic image, and the
1-800-QUIT-NOW number. Each group then answered questions designed to
assess, among other things, whether the graphic warnings, relative to the text-only
control, (1) increased viewers’ intention to quit or refrain from smoking; (2)
increased viewers’ knowledge of the health risks of smoking or secondhand
smoke; and (3) were “salient,” which FDA defined in part as causing viewers to
feel “depressed,” “discouraged,” or “afraid.”
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
77. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,642.
78. See generally id. But see infra note 317 and accompanying text (explaining that the
government abandoned this final rule, and thus the nine images and textual warnings, as a
result of litigation and tobacco industry opposition).
79. See Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images To Deter Smokers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/health/policy/22smoke.html?_r=0
(displaying the nine images).
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warnings to list the phone number of a smoking cessation hotline, 1-800QUIT-NOW.80
B. The First Amendment: The Freedom To Speak and Not To Speak
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”81 The freedom of
expression is a fundamental, foundational right82 and is central to the
democratic process and individual participation in it.83 As such, the
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects individuals from
federal, state, and local governmental interference with this right.84
Constitutional scholars argue that the First Amendment was a reaction
against political speech and press restrictions in English society.85 Outside
this narrow realm, however, it is unclear what the drafters intended the First
Amendment to protect.86 As such, the Supreme Court has had to opine on
the speech that the First Amendment protects, the speech that the
government can regulate, and the proper framework for scrutinizing the
constitutionality of such acts.87 This section briefly introduces the First
Amendment, as well as the Court’s approach to evaluating measures that

80. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,674. Individual states and the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services sponsor this “quitline.” See Frequently Asked Questions
About Quitlines, SMOKEFREE.GOV, http://www.smokefree.gov/quitlines-faq.aspx (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (characterizing the freedom
of thought and speech as “the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom.”); see also 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 14 (4th ed. 2007) (calling First
Amendment freedom a “touchstone of individual liberty”).
83. See, e.g., EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN BUSINESS 36 (1985) (noting
that free speech is an integral part of democratic society).
84. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2, 13–16 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the scope of First Amendment protection); Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 58–59 (2000) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has
used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply all First Amendment protections to state and local
governments).
85. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 952 (4th
ed. 2011) (“There is . . . little doubt that the First Amendment was meant to prohibit
licensing of publication such as existed in England and to forbid punishment for seditious
libel.”); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 82, at 15–24 (describing the English
background of the First Amendment).
86. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-18 to -19 (1994) (“One can keep going round and round on the
original meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of what the framers
meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge.”); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (noting that the drafters found free speech to be
important, but that they did not define the specific meaning of the First Amendment).
87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, at 953; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1130 (7th ed. 2004) (stating that the Court developed its
framework for First Amendment analysis in the last quarter of the twentieth century).
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compel speech, measures that restrict commercial speech, and measures that
require factual disclosures.
1. An Introduction to the First Amendment
The First Amendment’s language is simple and unqualified.88 Despite
this simplicity and absoluteness,89 however, the Supreme Court has never
taken an absolutist approach in interpreting it.90 Rather, it has held that the
First Amendment allows restraints on free speech for “appropriate
reasons.”91 The Court’s approach to determining the legitimate instances in
which speech may be restricted is one based on content neutrality.92
According to this framework, regulations affecting speech are classified
either as content based or content neutral.93
Content-based laws, as the moniker suggests, restrict or compel speech
based on the speech’s content.94 With some categorical exceptions,95 these
regulations are “presumptively invalid”96 unless they pass muster under
strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review.97 To survive strict
scrutiny, the government must (1) show a compelling interest in
promulgating the regulation, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote
that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is
available.98 Underlying this hardline approach is the core belief that “each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving
of expression, consideration, and adherence” and that “Government action
88. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
767–72 (17th ed. 2010) (outlining the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
89. Justice Hugo Black argued that the First Amendment should be interpreted literally
and thus that speech should never be subject to restrictions. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 880 (1960) (arguing that the plain language of the
Constitution shows that the First Amendment did not contain “any qualifications”).
90. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting the view that
First Amendment freedoms are absolute). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (3d ed. 2008).
91. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
92. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). The Court articulated this
principle of content neutrality in its statement that “above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.” Id. at 95.
93. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1131.
94. An example of a content-based speech restriction is a ban on sexually explicit
speech. Eugene Volokh, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment (Including the
“Secondary Effects” Doctrine), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/2010/06/21/content-discrimination-and-the-first-amendment-includingthe-secondary-effects-doctrine/. In this example, other types of speech are not banned.
Because this restriction treats speech differently based on the subject matter of the speech,
the restriction is “content-based.” Id.
95. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (noting the categorical exceptions to
the content-based/content-neutral analytical framework).
96. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
97. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, at 960–61.
98. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (defining
the strict scrutiny standard for content-based restrictions).
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that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance
of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this
essential right.”99 So severe is this burden that the government rarely meets
it.100
In contrast to content-based laws, content-neutral regulations affect
speech without regard to the speech’s content.101 The Court allows the
government to place reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech.102 Accordingly, such measures are examined under
intermediate scrutiny, which is a more lenient form of judicial review.103
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that (1) the
regulation is within its constitutional power, (2) the regulation furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the restriction is no greater
than necessary to further that interest.104
This is not to imply, however, that all speech and all laws that regulate
speech fall neatly into this either-or framework.105 Indeed, the Court has
deemed certain classes of speech as having “lower value” and thus entitled
to less or no protection under the First Amendment.106 These categories
include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech relating to
criminal conduct.107 Additionally, commercial speech108 and compelled
speech that corrects potentially misleading information109 are two subsets
of content-based expression that the Court reviews less stringently.110
99. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641.
100. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1131.
101. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). Examples of content-neutral speech
are bans on loudspeakers or leafleting. Volokh, supra note 94. Because the restriction treats
speech the same regardless of what the speech says, it is “content-neutral.” Id.
102. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1132.
103. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642.
104. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (establishing a four-part
standard to test if a content-neutral regulation passes intermediate scrutiny).
105. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” (citations omitted)).
106. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 928 (2009) (exploring the Court’s categorical approach
to the First Amendment and noting that “when people speak about the categorical approach,
they are referring to the rules that give lesser protection to certain content based on its
supposed lack of value”).
107. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (enumerating categories
of “lower value” speech); see also Louis J. Virelli III, Permissible Burden or Constitutional
Violation? A First Amendment Analysis of Congress’ Proposed Removal of Tax
Deductibility from Tobacco Advertisements, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 534–35 & n.31
(2000) (noting that libel, slander, obscenity, and incitement fall outside First Amendment
protection).
108. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing commercial speech and the framework for analyzing
the First Amendment constitutionality of laws that restrict it).
109. See infra Part I.B.4 (discussing mandated factual disclosures and the standard for
evaluating their constitutionality).
110. See infra Part I.B.3.b (explaining that the Supreme Court’s examination of measures
that restrict commercial speech is a test of intermediate scrutiny); infra Part I.B.4 (examining
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2. Compelled Speech
The First Amendment not only protects the right to speak freely; it also
protects the right to refrain from speaking.111 This right is so strong, in
fact, that the Court has found the distinction between compelled speech and
compelled silence “without constitutional significance.”112 Two cases form
the core of the Court’s compelled speech doctrine: West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette113 and Wooley v. Maynard.114 A third
compelled speech case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California,115 is germane as it illustrates the Court’s
application of Barnette and Wooley in the commercial context.
In 1943, the Court in Barnette examined a regulation adopted by the
West Virginia State Board of Education that required students to salute the
American flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.116 A student’s
noncompliance with this rule would result in expulsion.117 A group of
Jehovah’s Witnesses sued to enjoin the law, arguing that it infringed on
their First Amendment rights.118 The Court agreed, finding that the law
impermissibly invaded the students’ “intellect and spirit,” which the First
Amendment protects from “official control.”119
Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Court, articulated this idea and, in
the process, established the Court’s compelled speech doctrine:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.120

Forty-four years later in 1977, the Court reaffirmed Barnette’s central
precept in Wooley.121 In Wooley, a husband and wife challenged a New
Hampshire law that made it a crime to block out any part of that state’s
automobile license plate, including the state motto embossed on it.122 The
couple considered that motto, “Live Free or Die,” repugnant to their moral,

the Court’s approach to required disclosures that correct potential misleading speech, which
is rational basis review).
111. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 85, at 1001 (summarizing the Court’s approach to compelled speech); Anna M.
Taruschio, Note, The First Amendment, the Right Not To Speak and the Problem of
Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001 (2000).
112. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
113. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
114. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
115. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
116. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627–29.
117. See id. at 629.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 642.
120. See id.
121. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
122. See id. at 707.
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religious, and political beliefs and covered it up, resulting in multiple
misdemeanor charges.123
Reviewing the law for First Amendment defects, the Supreme Court
found the law to be unconstitutional, explaining: “The right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”124 This core value thus
prohibited New Hampshire from compelling the couple to “use their
private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message.”125
As Barnette and Wooley illustrate, the Court treats identically laws that
compel content-based speech and laws that restrict content-based speech
and subjects both to strict scrutiny review.126 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission, the Court made clear that this right not to
speak extends not only to individuals but also to corporations.127 In that
case, the Court scrutinized a decision by a California regulator that forced
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), a private utility company, to print on its
billing envelopes the views of a private advocacy organization with which
the company disagreed.128 Equating the envelopes at issue with the
automobile in Wooley, the Court determined that strict scrutiny applied,
held that the regulator could not order the utility to use its private property
to distribute the third party’s message,129 and struck down the regulation.130
3. Commercial Speech: “The Stepchild of the First Amendment”131
Although the text of the First Amendment does not differentiate between
commercial and noncommercial speech, the Supreme Court has recognized
such a distinction.132 The Court has yet to establish the exact contours of

123. See id. at 707–08.
124. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 715.
126. See id. at 715–16.
127. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (“For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the
choice of what not to say.”).
128. See id. at 4–7. This organization, called Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN), was a consumer activist organization that regularly opposed PG&E in ratemaking
proceedings. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699,
1739 (1991). The state regulator ordered that the “space remaining in the [PG&E] billing
envelope, after inclusion of the monthly bill” had to be divided between the utility and
TURN. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6.
129. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 17–18 (“[In Wooley,] [t]he ‘private property’
that was used to spread the unwelcome message was the automobile, not the license plates.
Similarly, the Commission’s order requires appellant to use its property—the billing
envelopes—to distribute the message of another.”).
130. See id. at 20–21.
131. Comment, Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1027–29 (1967) (discussing the constitutional status of commercial speech).
132. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-history and Pre-history of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 757–58 (1993).
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what constitutes commercial speech;133 however, it has said that, at the very
least, it is speech that “propose[s] a commercial transaction,” such as
advertising.134
a. From “No Protection” to “Limited Protection”: The Beginning
of the Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
protect commercial speech.135 This changed in 1975, when the Court
offered commercial speech limited constitutional protection.136 A year
later, the Court clarified its position in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,137 striking down a state law that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.138
In doing so, the Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects both
the right to disseminate and receive information139 and that a speaker’s
economic interests do not affect those rights.140

133. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (noting
that “the precise bounds” of commercial speech “are subject to doubt”).
134. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976); see also Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989)
(noting that the test for whether speech is commercial is whether it proposes a commercial
transaction). The Court also has said that commercial speech (1) is an advertisement of
some kind, (2) refers to a specific product, and (3) represents the speaker’s economic
motivation. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (finding
unsolicited mailings of contraceptive information to be commercial speech and holding that
a federal statute prohibiting distribution of such information violated the First Amendment).
135. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding a city ordnance that
outlawed the circulation of handbills and explaining that “the Constitution imposes no . . .
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”); see also Martin H.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971) (“[The Court in Chrestensen,]
without citing precedent, historical evidence, or policy considerations, . . . effectively read
commercial speech out of the First Amendment.”). See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra
note 132, at 754–59 (giving an overview of the development of the commercial speech
doctrine).
136. Interestingly, commercial speech protection first arose in the public health context.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (holding that advertisements for abortion
services in newspapers are protected by the First Amendment and that “speech is not
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears” as a commercial
advertisement); see also M. Neil Browne et al., Advertising to Children and the Commercial
Speech Doctrine: Political and Constitutional Limitations, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 91–92
(2009) (noting that Bigelow clarified commercial speech protection for certain activities).
Later cases would solidify this connection. See infra notes 137–44, 169 and accompanying
text (detailing the Court’s decisions in cases regarding speech restrictions in the public
health context, including acts regulating the advertising of the price of prescription drugs,
alcohol, and cigarettes).
137. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629–31 (1990) (discussing the evolution of
commercial speech starting in 1976).
138. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50.
139. See id. at 756–57.
140. See id. at 762.
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The Court also recognized that the consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information, particularly information regarding drug prices,
may surpass her interest in political discourse,141 a realm of speech long
deemed by the Court as deserving of First Amendment protection.142 For
these reasons, the Court held that the First Amendment protects speech that
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction,”143 as long as that
speech is not false, deceptive or misleading.144
b. The Court Establishes a Standard with Central Hudson
Four years after the Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment
protected commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court articulated a
test to evaluate the constitutionality of government regulation of
commercial speech in Central Hudson.145 This four-part test, which the
Court later identified as one of intermediate scrutiny,146 asks: (1) Is the
speech at issue not deceptive or false and does it concern lawful activity?147
(2) Is the government’s restriction justified by a substantial government
interest?148 (3) Does the regulation directly advance the government’s
asserted interest?149 (4) Is the restriction no more extensive than
necessary?150 Answering “yes” to each of these queries yields a regulation
that constitutionally restricts commercial speech; any “no” answer indicates
a regulation that is unconstitutional.151
At issue in Central Hudson was a New York law that prohibited
promotional advertising by utility companies.152 An energy shortage had
prompted the New York Public Service Commission to order this ban.153
141. In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun opined eloquently on the value of
commercial speech: “As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s
most urgent political debate.” Id. at 763–64; see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2000) (contending that commercial speech
is constitutionally protected because of the informational function that advertising serves).
But see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 486 (1985) (contending that commercial speech should not be constitutionally
protected because it is unaffiliated with the political process); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco
Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606–07 (1996) (arguing that
commercial speech should not be afforded the same protection as noncommercial speech).
142. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the high value placed on the
free flow of political discourse in First Amendment jurisprudence).
143. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citation omitted).
144. See id. at 771–72.
145. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
146. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“[The Court] engage[s]
in ‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing them under the
framework set forth in [Central Hudson].”).
147. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 558.
153. See id. at 558–59.
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The thinking behind it was that advertising promoted the use of electricity,
which increased consumer demand despite insufficient sources of supply.154
Three years after the ban, the energy crisis had passed, but the advertising
restriction remained in force.155 Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corporation filed suit, alleging that the ban violated its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.156
In this context, the Court developed and applied its four-prong test.157
The Court found that the first two prongs of the test were satisfied158: the
utility’s promotional advertising was not misleading or unlawful,159 and the
State’s asserted interests in conserving energy and maintaining fair and
efficient electricity rates were substantial.160 Under the third prong, the
Court accepted the State’s argument that advertising and electricity demand
were directly connected and that an advertising ban would lessen demand
for it, thus establishing a link between the State’s interest in conservation
and the Commission’s advertising ban.161
However, the regulation failed the fourth prong of the test.162 Under it,
the Court concluded that the State had failed to establish that the regulation
was not more extensive than necessary to further its substantial interest in
energy conservation.163 Troubling to the Court was that the ban implicated
all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on energy consumption;
the State had not shown that a less restrictive regulation would not
accomplish its goal of energy conservation.164 For this reason, the Court
declared the law unconstitutional.165
With Central Hudson, the Court established a test for examining
measures that regulate commercial speech.166 In doing so, however, the
Court did not specify the scope of this test.167 It was therefore unclear if the
standard should apply solely to the type of restriction addressed in Central
Hudson—a law that restricts speech—or if the standard should apply more
generally to any law that affects commercial speech, regardless of whether
that law restricts speech or compels it.168 Of note, however, is that since its

154. See id. at 559.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 560–61.
157. See id. at 566–72; see also supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
158. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–69.
159. See id. at 566–68.
160. See id. at 568–69.
161. See id. at 569. The Court, however, dismissed the state’s argument of a connection
between the energy advertising ban and fair rates as “speculative” and “tenuous.” Id.
162. See id. at 569–72.
163. Id. at 569–70.
164. Id. at 570.
165. Id. at 570–72.
166. Id. at 566.
167. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum,
19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 218 (2011).
168. See id.
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decision in Central Hudson, the Court has only used this standard to test
measures that restrict speech.169
4. Factual Disclosures that Prevent Consumer Deception
Five years after Central Hudson, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a required disclosure provision in Zauderer.170 The
Court held that compelled disclosures of “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” that aim to protect consumers from
“confusion or deception” and that are not “unjustified or unduly
burdensome” are to be reviewed under the rational basis standard.171
In so holding, the Court carved out an exception to its compelled and
commercial speech doctrines: if a compelled disclosure met certain criteria,
then rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, applied.
Since that decision, courts have applied and developed this exception.
a. The Supreme Court Creates the Zauderer Exception to Strict Scrutiny for
the Correction of Potentially Misleading Speech
Zauderer involved an Ohio attorney who published an advertisement
offering to represent women who were injured by a faulty medical
device.172 The advertisement featured an illustration of the medical device
and asserted that losing clients would not owe legal fees;173 it did not
disclose that clients would owe court costs and expenses.174
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
disciplined the lawyer for publishing this advertisement on the grounds that
he violated three Disciplinary Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional
Practice: a rule prohibiting advertisements containing information or
advice about a specific legal problem; a rule banning the use of illustrations
in attorney advertising; and a rule forbidding attorney deception.175 The

169. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (using Central
Hudson to examine and strike down restrictions on outdoor advertising and point-of-sale
advertising of tobacco products); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(declaring unconstitutional under Central Hudson a law banning the advertising of alcohol
prices); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding
under Central Hudson a law restricting gambling casinos from advertising to residents);
Michelle Silva Fernandes, Note, Party Foul: The Fourth Circuit’s Improper Application of
the Commercial Speech Test in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (2011) (exploring restrictions on alcohol advertisements in
college student publications and arguing that Central Hudson is the proper standard for
analyzing them).
170. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
171. See id. at 651 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See id. at 629–31. The defective device was a Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.
See id. at 630.
173. See id. at 630–31.
174. See id. at 633.
175. See id. at 634–35.
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lawyer appealed the decision, contending that the Ohio Code violated the
First Amendment.176
The Supreme Court examined the three code provisions for First
Amendment defects, striking down the first two but upholding the third.177
Regarding the first, the Court held that a state could not prohibit advertising
geared to persons with a specific legal problem.178
As for the second, the Court recognized that visual components of
advertisements served important communicative functions: graphics attract
the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message and have the ability
to impart information directly.179 For this reason, images were entitled to
the same First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial
speech.180 Consequently, the Court held that advertisements could contain
illustrations as long as those graphic were not deceptive, misleading, or
confusing.181
The Court found, however, that the third disciplinary charge brought
against the lawyer—that is, his failure to disclose in the advertisement that
his clients might be liable for litigation costs even if their lawsuits were
unsuccessful—was constitutional.182 Notably, the Court declined to use
either strict scrutiny or the Central Hudson test to assess the rule’s
constitutionality.183 Rather, the Court reviewed the rule using rational basis
assessment.184
The Court gave two reasons for taking this approach.185 First, the Court
distinguished the speech requirement in Wooley and Barnette from the
disclosure requirement at issue in Zauderer.186 In Wooley and Barnette,
laws forced speakers to voice political, nationalistic, religious orthodoxy, or
other “matters of opinion,”187 while in Zauderer, the requirement
compelled the disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial
information” about legal services.188 For the Court, this was significant, as
the Zauderer disclosure was of importance to consumers.189 The Court
further explained that its justification for protecting commercial speech
under the First Amendment was chiefly concerned with the information’s
176. See id. at 636.
177. See id. at 639–53.
178. Id. at 641–42.
179. Id. at 647.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 650–52.
183. See id. at 651–52 & n.14.
184. See id. at 651.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
188. Id.
189. See id. (“[B]ecause disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might
be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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value to consumers. In this case, an attorney’s constitutionally protected
interest in not providing the required factual information was “minimal.”190
Second, the Court found that unlike the regulation at issue in Central
Hudson, the disclosure requirement did not restrict speech—it compelled
it191—and thus encroached more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than
an across-the-board prohibition.192 For these the two reasons, the Court
decided to employ rational basis review, finding that the disclosure
requirement was reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
consumer deception of consumers, and upheld the rule.193
Thus, with Zauderer, the Court established a rational basis standard that
is applicable to certain laws that require disclosures. If (1) a compelled
disclosure consists of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,”
(2) aims to protect consumers from “confusion or deception,” and (3) is not
“unjustified or unduly burdensome,” then that disclosure requirement is
scrutinized to determine if it reasonably relates to the state’s interest, rather
than the more stringent strict scrutiny standard that is applied in other First
Amendment contexts.194
b. Zauderer Applied: Three Instructive Cases
After the Supreme Court defined this narrow exception to its compelled
and commercial speech doctrines, the Court and numerous circuit courts
have ruled on the constitutionality of disclosure requirements. In doing so,
the courts have delineated the reach and import of the Zauderer exception.
Three cases in particular—Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy;195 Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States;196 and Entertainment Software Ass’n v.
Blagojevich197—are used as authority by the parties in litigation over the
graphic warning labels and thus are relevant for understanding the circuit
split.
The Supreme Court decided Ibanez in 1994, nine years after Zauderer.
Similar to the facts of Zauderer, Ibanez involved an attorney who was
reprimanded for violating rules of professional conduct.198 In addition to
her membership in the Florida bar, Ibanez was a Certified Public
Accountant and a Certified Financial Planner (CFP),199 and she included
this CFP designation in her yellow pages listing, on her business cards, and

190. Id.
191. Id. at 650 (noting the “material differences between disclosure requirements and
outright prohibitions on speech”).
192. Id. at 651.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
196. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
197. 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
198. See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 139–42.
199. See id. at 138.
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on her law office letterhead.200 The Florida Board of Accountancy, a state
regulator, argued that the use of this “specialist” designation was
“potentially misleading” to consumers.201 The board sought to require
Ibanez to include a disclaimer on her promotional materials that explained
that the accrediting agency was not affiliated with the government and that
set out the agency’s accreditation requirements.202
On review, the Supreme Court found the board’s action unjustified
because it had failed “to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely
hypothetical.”203 As such, the Court declined to apply the Zauderer
standard because the board could not show that the commercial speech at
issue would mislead consumers.204 The Court also noted that the proposed
disclaimer was “unduly burdensome.”205
Milavetz is another case cited in litigation over the graphic warning
labels. In Milavetz, the Court analyzed and upheld two disclosure
provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) using Zauderer.206 One of the challenged provisions
required debt relief agencies to “clearly and conspicuously disclose in any
advertisement of bankruptcy assistance services . . . that the services or
benefits are with respect to bankruptcy relief.”207 Another provision
required qualifying professionals to state: “We are a debt relief agency.
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”208
The Milavetz law firm challenged the enforcement of BAPCPA’s
disclosure requirements,209 arguing an intermediate scrutiny standard
governed and that the State’s attempt to compel speech should be struck
down.210
The Court declined to apply Central Hudson for two reasons.211 First,
the Court found that the BAPCPA provision “share[d] the essential features
of the rule at issue in Zauderer.”212 Because the BAPCPA provision, like
the rule of professional conduct at issue in Zauderer, was directed at
correcting misleading speech, Zauderer governed.213 Second, the Court
distinguished the challenged BAPCPA disclosure requirement, which

200. See id.
201. Id. at 146.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 146–47 (“The detail required in the disclaimer currently described by the
Board effectively rules out notation of the ‘specialist’ designation on a business card or
letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing.”).
206. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340–41
(2010).
207. Id. at 1330 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1339.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 1340.
213. Id. at 1339.
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compelled speech, from the rule scrutinized in Central Hudson, which
restricted speech.214 The Court then examined the BAPCPA provision and
upheld it because, like in Zauderer, the law firm’s advertisements were
“inherently misleading” because the advertisements promised “debt relief
without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has
inherent costs.”215
Finally, Blagojevich, a decision from the Seventh Circuit, is also
informative. At issue in Blagojevich was an Illinois law that required video
game retailers to place a four-square-inch “18” sticker on video games that
fell within the State’s definition of “sexually explicit.”216 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the sticker “force[d] the game-seller to include . . . a
subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s content is
sexually explicit.”217 Because of the subjectivity and controversial nature
of this required disclosure, the Seventh Circuit held that Zauderer did not
apply and instead used strict scrutiny.218 In doing so, it found that the
sticker “literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored” because the sticker
covered a substantial portion of the box and the State “failed to . . . explain
why a smaller sticker would not suffice.”219 For this reason, the Seventh
Circuit invalidated the law.220
II. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS: THE GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS’
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING IT
Part II outlines the conflict between the Sixth and D.C. Circuits over the
constitutionality of the TCA’s labeling requirement. It pays particular
attention to the different frameworks that the circuits and district courts
employed to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and those courts’
application of those standards to evaluate the graphic warning labels.
Part II.A details the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States,221 which affirmed a lower court judgment
finding the required use of graphics constitutional. The Sixth Circuit relied
on Zauderer in using rational basis review, rejecting the trial court’s use of
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, to affirm the trial court’s
conclusion that the graphics-based speech could be mandated. Part II.B
discusses the D.C. Circuit’s decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA,222 which affirmed a lower court ruling that the images violated the
214. Id. (“[B]ecause the challenged provisions impose a disclosure requirement rather
than an affirmative limitation on speech, . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer
governs our review.”).
215. Id. at 1340.
216. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 652.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
222. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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First Amendment. The D.C. Circuit, however, rejecting the strict scrutiny
standard that had been employed by the district court, examined the images
using the Central Hudson factors.
A. The Sixth Circuit: Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States
In Discount Tobacco City, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial
challenge223 to the TCA’s labeling requirement.224 The court determined
that the provision was subject to the strict scrutiny required by the First
Amendment unless the speech was designed to correct misleading
Applying this
information, in which case Zauderer controlled.225
framework, the court determined that the Zauderer rational basis test
governed226 and held that the regulation passed this review and was
constitutional.227 In doing so, the panel majority upheld the district court’s
judgment.228 One judge, after examining the rule under Zauderer,
dissented, argued that the provision was not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.229
1. The District Court: The Graphic Warning Label Requirement Is
Constitutional Using Central Hudson Intermediate Scrutiny
In late August 2009, approximately two months after President Obama
signed the TCA into law,230 six tobacco manufacturers and retailers231 filed
suit in the Western District of Kentucky.232 The tobacco companies
challenged several of the TCA’s provisions, including the graphic warning
label requirement,233 which they argued violated their rights to free speech
223. A “facial challenge” is “[a] claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face—that
is, that it always operates unconstitutionally.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009).
224. The lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, was an as-applied challenge. See
infra Part II.B.
225. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 253–63 and accompanying text.
227. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
228. See infra Part II.A.1.
229. See infra Part II.A.3.
230. The TCA became law in June 2009. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
231. The six plaintiff companies in the suit were Commonwealth Brands, Conwood,
Discount Tobacco City and Lottery, Lorillard, National, and R.J. Reynolds. See
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d
509 (6th Cir. 2012). Altria Group, Inc., the United States’ largest tobacco company, openly
supports the TCA and is not a party to any of the litigation challenging it. See Press Release,
Altria Grp., Altria Group Supports Senate Approval of Tobacco Industry Regulation (June
11, 2009), available at http://investor.altria.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=80855&p=RssLanding&
cat=news&id=1298458 (calling the TCA “an important step forward” and “tough but
reasonable” but “not perfect” because of some of its provisions infringe on the First
Amendment).
232. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
233. The tobacco companies challenged four other provisions of the TCA: (1) restrictions
on the marketing of “modified-risk tobacco products”; (2) a ban on claims that convey the
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under the First Amendment.234 Because of this timing, the suit constituted
a facial challenge to the labeling provision.235 As such, the district court
assessed the First Amendment constitutionality of the provision itself; it did
not examine the particular images that the FDA eventually chose for the
labels.236
The tobacco companies put forth three arguments in support of their
claim.237 First, relying on Ibanez and citing data demonstrating that the
public was aware of smoking’s risks and overestimated them,238 the
companies argued that because there was no real harm for the warnings to
remedy, the warning provision was unnecessary.239 Second, the companies
claimed that the warnings required by the TCA were unlawful because they
were larger and more prominent than the disclosures invalidated in
Blagojevich240 and Ibanez.241 Finally, the companies contended that,
because the disclosure requirement did not fall within the Zauderer
exception, the graphics requirement should be assessed using strict scrutiny
and struck down.242
The district court dismissed each of these arguments.243 First, citing
studies that illustrated both the ineffectiveness of the purely textual
warnings and the improved efficacy expected to come from the TCA labels,
the court found the labeling requirement to be justified.244 Second, the
court found that the government had provided reasons for the particular size
and format of the TCA warnings, distinguishing them from the warnings
struck down in Blagojevich, in which the State failed to explain why a
smaller warning would be inappropriate.245 Finally, the court rejected the
companies’ argument to review the restriction under strict scrutiny.246 The
court reasoned that because the textual element of the TCA warnings was
objective and uncontroversial, the additional graphic element was too.247
impression that tobacco products are approved by, or safer by virtue of being regulated by,
the FDA; (3) prohibitions on color and imagery in tobacco product advertising; (4) bans of
event sponsorship, branding nontobacco merchandise, and free sampling. See id. at 519–20.
234. See id. at 521.
235. Since the suit in the district court was filed two months after the passage of the TCA,
the FDA had not yet selected the images for the labels. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552–54 (6th Cir. 2012). A facial challenge was thus the
only challenge that the tobacco companies could mount. See id.
236. Id. at 552–53.
237. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 528–31.
238. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text (striking down an attorney
disclosure requirement as not rationally related to state’s interest under Zauderer).
239. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
240. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text (using strict scrutiny to invalidate a
law requiring video game retailers to place a warning sticker on video games that fell within
the state’s definition of “sexually explicit”).
241. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529–30.
242. See id. at 530.
243. See id. at 530–32.
244. See id. at 530–31.
245. See id. at 531.
246. See id. at 531–32.
247. See id.
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After rejecting these arguments, the court subjected the provision to
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.248 In doing so, the court
found that the warnings were sufficiently tailored to advance the
government’s substantial interest.249 As a result, on January 5, 2010, the
district court granted summary judgment to the government on the labeling
requirement claim.250
2. The Sixth Circuit Affirms, but Does So Using
Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer
On March 19, 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment.251 The court examined the law using a two-step framework: if
the disclosure fit within Zauderer, rational basis review applied; if it did
not, strict scrutiny applied under the Supreme Court’s compelled speech
doctrine.252 The Sixth Circuit did not consider applying the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.
Debunking arguments that images could never be factual or accurate, the
court determined that the provision ought to be assessed under Zauderer.253
The court cited three reasons for this. First, the court referenced images
found in textbooks, from which students learn factual information about the
body and disease.254 Despite the possibility that people could have medical
conditions that deviate from the depictions found in a textbook, those
images remain factual; they do not become nonfactual or opinions.255
Second, the court of appeals relied on Zauderer itself, reasoning that,
because the Supreme Court had deemed the illustration of the medical
device in that case to be constitutionally permissible,256 pictures that
accurately represent the negative health consequences of smoking were
acceptable, too.257
Finally, the court distinguished the TCA’s labeling requirement from the
disclosure struck down in Blagojevich. The TCA’s required warning was
248. Id. at 532.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 519.
251. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir.
2012). Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial challenge to the TCA’s
labeling provision. See id. at 552–54. By the time this case reached the circuit court, the
FDA had selected the nine images to appear on the warning label and had published its final
rule regarding the new warnings. See id. at 552–53. Citing judicial restraint, the language of
the district court’s decision, the tobacco companies’ admission that the challenge was a
facial one, and Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit declined to review the labeling
provision as-applied—that is, to review the specific images themselves for constitutional
defects. See id. at 553.
252. See id. at 554.
253. See id. at 558–61.
254. See id. at 559.
255. See id.
256. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (holding that images are entitled to
the same First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial speech).
257. See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560.
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designed to provide factual information, while the Blagojevich disclosure
communicated the opinion of the government.258 For these reasons, the
court concluded that the TCA’s labeling provision should be assessed using
Zauderer rational basis review and was not subject to strict scrutiny.259
After determining that Zauderer governed, the court examined the
labeling requirement to determine whether the government had established
a rational relationship between the provision and the goal of preventing
consumer deception.260 The court determined that the government had
successfully carried its burden, citing the tobacco industry’s “decades-long
deception” of the public about the health risks and the addictiveness of
smoking;261 evidence that the existing warning requirements ineffectively
conveyed the risks of tobacco use, particularly to youths and adults with
low levels of education;262 and evidence that larger warnings that
incorporate images led to a greater understanding of smoking’s health
consequences.263 For these reasons, the court of appeals found that the
requirement passed muster under rational basis and was constitutionally
permissible.264 The tobacco companies petitioned for a rehearing en banc,
which was denied on May 31, 2012,265 and filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari on October 26, 2012.266
3. The Dissent: The Requirement Fails
Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer
The dissenting judge in Discount Tobacco City, Judge Eric L. Clay,
agreed with the panel majority that the provision should be scrutinized
under Zauderer.267 However, after doing so, Judge Clay concluded that the
government had not shown that the warning labels were a reasonably
tailored response to addressing tobacco consumers’ ignorance of smoking’s
harms.268 Specifically, Judge Clay was troubled that the graphic warning

258. See id. at 560–61.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 562.
261. See id. (“Tobacco manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations . . .
knowingly and actively conspired to deceive the public about the health risks and
addictiveness of smoking for decades.”).
262. See id. at 562–64 (“[T]he evidence unsurprisingly shows that most people do not
understand the full dangers of tobacco use.”).
263. See id. at 565 (“[A]bundant evidence establishes that larger warnings incorporating
graphics promote a greater understanding of tobacco-related health risks and materially
affect consumers’ decisions regarding tobacco use.”).
264. See id. at 569.
265. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Am. Snuff Co., LLC v. United States, No.
12-521 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012).
266. See id. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will
hear the appeal.
267. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527–28 (Clay, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 527–29.
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labels appeared calculated to provoke emotion and frighten consumers,
rather than educating them or correcting misinformation.269
Judge Clay identified a difference between providing truthful and
sometimes frightening information to the public and “flagrantly
manipulat[ing]” the emotions of consumers, and found it dispositive.270 For
Judge Clay, the latter was “less clearly permissible” than the former.271
This was because the images provoked differing emotions among those
who view them: some viewers inevitably interpret them in one fashion,
Because of this
while other viewers saw them another way.272
incongruence, Judge Clay concluded that the labels “cannot accurately
convey all of the health risks associated with tobacco use” and were thus
not reasonably tailored.273
B. The D.C. Circuit: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, the D.C. Circuit considered an as-applied
challenge274 to the TCA’s labeling requirement and examined the nine
images themselves for violations of the First Amendment. After concluding
that the labels were not subject to review under Zauderer (i.e., they
constituted mandated speech that was noncorrective), the court examined
the labels using Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard and found
that the warnings offended the First Amendment.275 In doing so, the court
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the D.C. District Court, which held that
the images were unconstitutional because they failed strict scrutiny.276 One
judge dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the labels, with the
exception of the 1-800-QUIT-NOW hotline number, were both
constitutional under Zauderer and Central Hudson.277
1. The District Court Holds That the Images Do Not Survive Strict
Scrutiny and Are Unconstitutional
On August 16, 2011, two months after the FDA issued its final rule about
the warnings and images, five tobacco manufacturers278 filed suit in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the TCA’s labeling
269. See id. at 528. Unlike the panel majority, Judge Clay addressed the graphic warning
label requirement both facially and as applied. See id.
270. Id. at 529.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 530.
273. Id.
274. An “as-applied challenge” is “[a] claim that a law or governmental policy, though
constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 223, at 261.
275. See infra notes 294–315 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 283–86 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 318–27 and accompanying text.
278. The five plaintiff companies in the suit were R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard,
Commonwealth Brands, Liggett, and Santa Fe. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845
F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012).
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provision, and the FDA’s implementation of it, violated their First
Amendment rights.279 Judge Richard J. Leon concluded that, because the
provision forced speech, it was subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme
Court’s compelled speech doctrine unless an exception—specifically,
rational basis review under Zauderer—applied.280 Judge Leon found that
an exception was not warranted because the images were not designed to
correct the same kind of misleading speech at issue in Zauderer and its
progeny.281 Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny.282
Judge Leon determined that the TCA labels failed all three parts of the
strict scrutiny analysis.283 Regarding the first element, Judge Leon found
that although the government’s interest in warning consumers about the
dangers of smoking was compelling, its interest in advocating that the
public not purchase cigarettes, a legal product, was not.284 As for the
second, Judge Leon concluded that the “‘sheer size and display
requirements for the graphic images are anything but narrowly tailored.’”285
Finally, Judge Leon accepted the five alternatives for reducing smoking
rates that the tobacco companies offered as viable, less burdensome, and
less restrictive than the warning labels.286
For these reasons, Judge Leon determined that the FDA failed to meet its
burden in proving that the graphic warning labels were narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.287 As a result, on February 29,
2012, Judge Leon found the graphic labels unconstitutional and enjoined
their rollout.288
2. The D.C. Circuit Affirms but Uses Intermediate Scrutiny
Under Central Hudson
On August 25, 2012, a divided panel affirmed Judge Leon’s judgment.289
The circuit court first determined the applicable level of scrutiny under
which it would examine the labeling requirement.290 Like the district court,
the D.C. Circuit recognized that content-based speech regulations—
279. See id. at 268.
280. See id. at 272.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 274–77.
284. See id. at 274–75.
285. Id. at 275 (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48
(D.D.C. 2011)).
286. See id. at 276. These five alternatives are: (1) the government could disseminate its
antismoking message itself; (2) the government could reduce the label display requirements
from 50 percent of the package to 20 percent; (3) the government could choose purely
factual and uncontroversial images; (4) the government could increase cigarette taxes; and
(5) the government could improve its efforts to prevent the unlawful sale of cigarettes to
minors. See id.
287. See id. at 275–77.
288. See id. at 277.
289. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
290. See id. at 1211–17.
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including compelled speech—were subject to strict scrutiny with some
exceptions.291 Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit enumerated two
exceptions in the commercial speech context: Zauderer and Central
Hudson.292 The court then examined the images to see if they fell into one
of these exempt categories.293
The court concluded that Zauderer was inapplicable.294 It reasoned that
because the TCA banned the practices and descriptors that would make
cigarette advertising and labeling misleading,295 and because of the absence
of congressional findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging
itself, scrutinizing the labels under Zauderer was unjustified.296 The court
then dismissed the argument that the failure to display the negative health
consequences of smoking in label disclosures was misleading297 and also
rejected the argument that the warning labels should be evaluated in the
context of the historical deception that preceded them.298
Finally, the court held that the graphic warnings did not constitute the
type of “‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information”299 or “accurate
statement[s],” to which the Zauderer standard applied.300 Rather, the court
characterized the images as “inflammatory”301 and as “unabashed attempts
to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers
into quitting.”302 It also determined that the images were subject to
misinterpretation by consumers.303
Because the case did not fall under Zauderer, the court then determined
whether strict or intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.304 Citing circuit
precedent305 and recognizing that other circuits held contrary views—
specifically, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco City and the Seventh

291. See id. at 1212.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 1217.
295. Id. at 1214 (“The [TCA] bans any labeling or advertising representing that any
tobacco product ‘presents a lower risk of tobacco-related disease or is less harmful than one
or more other commercially marketed tobacco products,’ ‘contains a reduced level of a
substance or presents a reduced exposure to a substance,’ or ‘does not contain or is free of a
substance.’ The Act also bans advertising or labeling using the descriptors ‘light,’ ‘mild,’
‘low,’ or similar descriptors.” (citation omitted)).
296. See id. at 1214–15.
297. See id. at 1215–16.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 1216 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)).
300. Id. (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324
(2010)).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1217.
303. Id. at 1216.
304. See id. at 1217.
305. See id. (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–43
(D.C. Cir. 2009)) (noting that compelled commercial speech disclosures are subject to
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson in the D.C. Circuit).
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Circuit in Blagojevich—the court held that Central Hudson was the
appropriate standard.306
The court then scrutinized the labels using Central Hudson.307 Applying
Central Hudson’s first prong, the court examined the administrative record
and found that the government’s primary goal in adopting the graphic
warning rule was to “discourage nonsmokers from initiating cigarette use
and to encourage current smokers to consider quitting.”308 The court
assumed that this interest was substantial and moved on.309
As for the second prong, the court evaluated whether the FDA had shown
“substantial evidence” that the graphic warnings would “directly” reduce
smoking rates.310 The court concluded that there was “no evidence
showing that [similar] warnings have directly caused a material decrease in
smoking rates in any of the countries that now require them.”311 The court
also took issue with the Canadian and Australian studies that the FDA had
relied on in promulgating the final rule, noting that while these studies
“indicated that large graphic warnings might induce individual smokers to
reduce consumption, or to help persons who have already quit smoking
remain abstinent,” the studies “did not purport to show that the
implementation of large graphic warnings has actually led to a reduction in
smoking rates.”312
For these reasons, the court concluded that the FDA had not provided “a
shred of evidence—much less the ‘substantial evidence’ . . . —showing that
the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the
number of Americans who smoke.”313 The court thus held that because the
graphic warnings did not satisfy Central Hudson’s second prong that the
restriction be sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest,314 they
were an unconstitutional restriction on the tobacco companies’ First
Amendment rights.315 The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc,
which was denied on December 5, 2012,316 and did not appeal the decision
to the Supreme Court.317
306. See id.
307. See id. at 1217–21.
308. Id. at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1219.
312. Id. (emphasis omitted).
313. Id. at 1219.
314. See id. at 1219.
315. See id. at 1222.
316. See Brett Norman, Court Blocks FDA Tobacco Warning Labels Appeal, POLITICO
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/court-blocks-fda-tobacco-warninglabels-appeal-84656.html (noting the denial of the FDA’s request for a rehearing en banc).
317. See Brady Dennis, Government Quits Legal Battle over Graphic Cigarette
Warnings, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/government-quits-legal-battle-over-graphic-cigarette-warnings/2013/03/19/23053
ccc-90d7-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html (“Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in
a letter to House Speaker John A. Boehner dated March 15[:] ‘In these circumstances, the
Solicitor General has determined, after consultation with [the Department of Health and
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3. The Dissent: The Images Fall Within Zauderer’s Ambit, Survive Both
Rational Basis and Central Hudson Review, and Are Constitutional
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Judith W. Rogers found that the labels
were constitutional under both Zauderer and Central Hudson, except with
regard to inclusion of the smoking cessation phone number, which she
found unconstitutional.318
To Judge Rogers, because the labels were “indisputably commercial
speech,” the question was whether Zauderer or Central Hudson applied.319
Judge Rogers argued that the labels presented factually accurate
information and addressed misleading commercial speech, so Zauderer
applied.320 Accordingly, she then subjected the labeling requirement to
rational basis review under Zauderer and found that it survived this basic
level of scrutiny.321
Additionally, Judge Rogers found the warnings constitutional under
Central Hudson.322 In reaching this conclusion, she took issue with the
majority’s articulation and examination of the government’s stated interests
in promulgating the labeling rule.323 Judge Rogers argued that the FDA
had articulated two complementary but distinct interests—decreasing
smoking rates and effectively communicating the negative health
consequences of smoking324—and that the majority erred in dismissing the
latter interest as “too vague.”325 By doing so, Judge Rogers argued, the
majority sidestepped much of the substantial evidence supporting the
warning label requirement326 and thus disregarded the “voluminous
findings” that illuminated a legitimate government interest to which the
labeling requirement was reasonably related.327 For this reason, Judge
Rogers determined that the government also met its burden under the
heightened scrutiny test of Central Hudson.328
Human Services] and FDA, not to seek Supreme Court review of the First Amendment
issues at the present time . . . .’”). The government cited the appeal deadline and the fierce
opposition to the labels from the tobacco industry in making this decision. Id. By abandoning
this legal battle, the government abandoned the final rule that it promulgated and thus the
nine images and textual warnings that it chose. Id. Writing in response to this decision, Dr.
Howard K. Koh, Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, vowed that “[t]he FDA . . . will undertake research to support new rulemaking on
graphic warning labels consistent with the [TCA].” Howard K. Koh, A Steadfast
Commitment To End the Tobacco Epidemic, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2013, 2:43 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-howard-k-koh/a-steadfast-commitment-to_b_2901521
.html.
318. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1222–23 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 1222.
320. See id. at 1233.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 1234–36.
323. See id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1223.
326. See id. at 1234–36.
327. Id. at 1223.
328. Id. at 1233–36.
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Finally, Judge Rogers found that requiring the tobacco companies to
include the 1-800-QUIT-NOW smoking cessation number on the graphic
labels was unconstitutional, reasoning that the government had not
explained why a less burdensome alternative was inadequate.329 She
concluded that the requirement was more extensive than necessary, thus
violating Central Hudson’s fourth prong.330
III. THE TCA’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS
SHOULD BE FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As discussed in Part II, the Sixth and D.C. Circuits disagree over the
constitutionality of the TCA’s graphic warning labels, the appropriate level
of scrutiny for analyzing these labels, and the appropriate framework for
selecting that scrutiny. This part argues that the Sixth Circuit and the
District Court for the District of Columbia pinpointed the correct
framework for analyzing the graphic warning labels but that only the D.C.
District Court applied it correctly. The D.C. District Court determined that
the graphic labels did not fall within the Zauderer exception and thus
analyzed them under strict scrutiny. The court then found that the labels
did not satisfy strict scrutiny and determined that they were
unconstitutional.
Accordingly, this part first asserts that the graphic warnings at issue in
this split should be examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer
exception applies. Central Hudson is inapposite because it has been
applied chiefly when commercial speech is restricted. This part then argues
that the graphic labels do not qualify for the Zauderer exception and
therefore must be strictly scrutinized. Finally, it concludes that the TCA
warning labels do not survive this level of review and are thus
unconstitutional.
A. A Framework for Analysis: The Labels Should Be Subjected to Strict
Scrutiny Unless the Zauderer Exception Applies
The legal controversy over the TCA’s graphic warning labels exposes the
current messy state of First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of
commercial speech.331 This section argues that the Sixth Circuit and the
D.C. District Court identified the correct paradigm for assessing the labels’
constitutionality: Zauderer’s rational basis standard applies if the graphic
Central
warnings are corrective, uncontroversial, and justified.332
Hudson’s test of intermediate scrutiny examines laws that restrict speech,
not laws that compel it,333 and thus is inappropriate for this analysis. As

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See id. at 1236–37.
See id.
See supra Part II.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
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such, should Zauderer not govern, the labels should be examined according
to strict scrutiny.
1. Zauderer Applies If the Warnings Are Corrective
Amid the confusion over the proper analytical framework for assessing
the graphic warnings, the place of the Zauderer exception is
unambiguous.334 Indeed, each of the decisions that form this circuit split—
the Sixth and D.C. Circuit majorities, the dissenting opinions, and the
district court judgments alike—include the Zauderer exception as a part of
their analytical frameworks.335 This is most certainly because the Supreme
Court is clear about Zauderer’s applicability: if a compelled commercial
disclosure (1) consists of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,”
(2) aims to protect consumers from “confusion or deception,” and (3) is not
“unjustified or unduly burdensome,”336 the disclosure falls within
Subsequent disclosure cases like Ibanez,338
Zauderer’s ambit.337
339
and Blagojevich340 confirm this.
Thus, because the
Milavetz,
requirement at issue in this split compels a disclosure of commercial
speech, the Zauderer exception is a necessary component in the
conversation regarding the First Amendment constitutionality of the labels.
For this reason, if the labels fall within the confines of the Zauderer
exception, they should be analyzed under it.
2. If Zauderer Does Not Apply, the Warning Labels Should Be Subjected
to Strict Scrutiny, Not Intermediate Scrutiny Under Central Hudson
Unlike the uncontested role of Zauderer within the analytical framework,
the second step in this constitutional analysis—the level of scrutiny that
should govern if Zauderer does not—is a source of considerable contention
among the four courts that have examined the TCA labels. As discussed in
Part II, the district court in Discount Tobacco City341 and the D.C. Circuit in
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco determined that Central Hudson applied if Zauderer
did not.342 The Sixth Circuit343 and the D.C. District Court, in contrast,
held that strict scrutiny applied.344 Thus, a critical element in resolving the
circuit split is to determine the default level of scrutiny should Zauderer not
apply: intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson or strict scrutiny as in
Wooley and Barnette?
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242, 252, 267, 280, 292, 320 and accompanying text.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra Part I.B.4.a.
See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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The confusion over Central Hudson’s relevance to assessing the labels
can be attributed in part to the fact that the Court did not specify the scope
of the Central Hudson standard in Central Hudson itself.345 As such,
Central Hudson’s role in the analysis is unclear from that decision alone.346
Later decisions employing Central Hudson do not expressly define the
standard’s contours.347 The Supreme Court should clarify this ambiguity to
avoid further disagreement and confusion.
This being said, the Court has implied that Central Hudson is
inapplicable when examining laws that compel commercial speech like the
TCA’s warning label requirement. First, in subsequent application of the
Central Hudson standard, the Court has only used it to determine the
constitutionality of laws that restrict speech, not compel it.348 This suggests
that the Court does not intend for Central Hudson to be the default standard
for assessing any and all laws that touch upon commercial speech. Instead,
it appears that Central Hudson should be used only to scrutinize regulations
that restrict commercial speech.
Second, in its required disclosure jurisprudence, the Court has
emphasized the significant differences between laws that restrict speech and
laws that compel it when deciding what standard of scrutiny to employ.
The Court cited this difference in Zauderer itself as one reason for
establishing a standard independent of Central Hudson.349 And in Milavetz,
the Court used the Zauderer standard because the challenged provision in
that case imposed a disclosure requirement; it expressly noted that Central
Hudson was inapplicable precisely because Central Hudson involved an
affirmative limitation on commercial speech.350
Although this second point is rooted in the Court’s rationale for applying
Zauderer in disclosure cases, it also highlights that a challenged provision’s
effect on commercial speech—that is, whether a law prohibits or forces
commercial speech—is of crucial importance and must be taken into
account. Furthermore, it suggests that Central Hudson’s scope is limited to
laws that dampen commercial speech, not to laws that compel it. For these
reasons, Central Hudson should not be used if Zauderer does not apply.351
Accordingly, strict scrutiny must be used to assess the warning labels’ First
Amendment fitness.
Strict scrutiny should apply not only because of deductive logic, but also
because the Court’s compelled speech doctrine requires it. This doctrine,
exemplified by Barnette, Wooley, and Pacific Gas & Electric Co., declares
that the state cannot force private individuals and corporations to express
345. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
351. But see Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539 (2012) (arguing that the graphic
warning labels should be examined under Central Hudson).
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views that are repugnant to them unless the government can satisfy strict
scrutiny review.352
Given that the TCA labeling provision compels speech in the commercial
context, the compelled speech doctrine should be used to analyze its
constitutionality. Furthermore, the issue addressed in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.—the constitutionality of a government regulation that
compelled a private company to voice the message of a third party with
which it disagreed—is identical to the controversy sparked by TCA’s
labeling provision.353 Therefore, just as the Sixth Circuit and the D.C.
District held, courts should apply the compelled speech doctrine unless the
Zauderer exception requires rational basis review.
B. Applying the Framework: The Labels Do Not Fall Within Zauderer’s
Ambit, Strict Scrutiny Applies, and the Labels Fail Under It
The previous section determined the appropriate framework for
examining the labels’ constitutionality. This section first applies this
structure to the labels and determines that Zauderer does not apply. It then
analyzes the labels under strict scrutiny and concludes that they do not pass
muster under this heightened form of review.
1. Zauderer Does Not Apply
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the labels should be
assessed under the Zauderer standard. This Note concludes that Zauderer
is inapplicable for three reasons.
First, Zauderer applies only under narrow circumstances. For Zauderer
to govern, the compelled commercial disclosure must consist of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” aimed to protect consumers from
“confusion or deception” that is not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”354
Thus, the disclosure requirement in question must be “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”355 Rather than
preventing deception, the government’s stated interest in promulgating the
new graphic labels is to warn consumers about the dangers of smoking and
to decrease smoking rates.356 Moreover, the government’s inclusion of the
1-800-QUIT-NOW number indicates that the purpose of the labels is not to
prevent deception but is instead to advocate an antismoking message. Thus,
while commendable as a public health strategy, the warning labels’ goals
differ significantly from the interest required to trigger the Zauderer
standard.

352. See supra Part I.B.2.
353. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
354. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
355. Id.
356. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Second, even if the government’s interest in promulgating the graphic
labels were to prevent consumer deception, the graphic labels are not
“reasonably related” to this interest. In Zauderer and Milavetz, the
Supreme Court upheld provisions that required disclaimers that, if absent,
would lead to almost certain deception and confusion in the marketplace.357
The graphic warnings labels are distinguishable from those disclaimers
because there is nothing inherently misleading about a cigarette package
without an additional graphic warning label. Cigarette packages already
possess textual warnings that convey factual information about smoking’s
dangers,358 and the absence of a graphical element does not alter this. The
disclaimers at issue in Zauderer, Ibanez, Milavetz, and Blagojevich all
aimed to correct present and immediate deception, not past corporate
deception. Thus, although the argument that the graphic labels correct the
tobacco industry’s history of deception is a compelling one, it does not fit
within the narrow confines of Zauderer’s applicability. Also, evidence that
indicates that consumers do not read the current cigarette warnings does not
mean that cigarette packages are therefore deceptive or misleading, merely
that the current labels are ineffective.359
Third, the images chosen by the FDA do not necessarily convey “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” as required for a disclosure to be
governed by Zauderer.360 Rather, the FDA selected the nine images
specifically to shock and provoke emotions like depression,
discouragement, and fear.361 Of course, the boundary between fact and
emotion is not a clear one. The presentation of facts often spurs emotion,
and vice versa. To fall within Zauderer’s ambit, a disclosure must impart
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.”362 The FDA’s chosen
images,363 in contrast, have the potential to be controversial and misleading.
Consider, for example, the photograph of a crying woman, which is coupled
with the phrase “Warning: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in
nonsmokers.”364 It has been proven that tobacco smoke leads to lung
disease in nonsmokers,365 and the textual warning that accompanies the
graphic image imparts this fact to the reader. The connection between the
photo of the distraught woman and the consequences of second-hand smoke
are not at all clear, especially when viewed without the accompanying
textual component. This is problematic, as one of the major reasons for
introducing the new graphic labels is to address the documented inadequacy
357. See supra notes 189, 215 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
360. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
361. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the survey employed by the
FDA to select the graphic images, which in part measured “salience,” which the FDA
defined in part as causing viewers to feel “depressed,” “discouraged,” or “afraid”).
362. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added).
363. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the nine warning images
chosen by the FDA).
364. See supra notes 69, 79 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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of the current labeling regime, which requires college-level readings skills
to be understood.366 Many of the other images are similarly controversial
and misleading.367 Taken together, the images cannot be said to impart
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.” For these reasons, the
warning labels do not fall within the Zauderer exception and therefore strict
scrutiny should apply.
2. The Labels Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny and
Are Thus Unconstitutional
Because Zauderer does not apply in this situation, strict scrutiny must be
used to analyze the labels. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must
(1) show a compelling interest, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote
that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is
available.368 The D.C. District Court’s application of this standard is
reasonable and should be adopted.
As discussed previously, the D.C. District Court determined that the TCA
labels fail each of the three elements of strict scrutiny.369 First, although
the government’s stated interest in educating consumers about the dangers
of smoking may be compelling, its actual interest in advocating that the
public not purchase cigarettes is not.370 Cigarettes are legal products, and
the TCA itself forbids the FDA from banning their sale or mandating the
elimination of nicotine from them.371
Second, the labels are not narrowly tailored because their size and display
requirements turn cigarette packages into a “mini-billboard” for the
government’s antismoking agenda.372 The graphic warnings are thus
similar to the four square inch sticker struck down in Blagojevich, which
“literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored” because the sticker covered a
substantial portion of the box.373
Finally, five less burdensome and less restrictive alternatives are
available to the government.374 These alternatives include the government
disseminating its antismoking message itself by increasing its antismoking
advertisements and issuing additional statements in the press urging
consumers to quit smoking.375 These options alone burden and restrict First
Amendment rights less than forcing the tobacco companies to advocate
against their economic interests through the graphic labeling regime.
366. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (detailing the drawbacks of the
current labeling requirement).
367. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 283–87 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
371. See 21 U.S.C. § 387g(d)(3) (Supp. V 2011) (restricting the FDA’s authority to
reduce nicotine levels to zero or to ban tobacco products).
372. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 276 (D.D.C. 2012).
373. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006).
374. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
375. Id.
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Consequently, the labels fail this part of the strict scrutiny test. For these
reasons, the graphic labels do not survive strict scrutiny and are thus
unconstitutional compulsions of commercial speech.
CONCLUSION
Cigarette smoking is one of the deadliest and costliest public health crises
in the United States, a fact exacerbated by the tobacco industry’s financial
might and history of consumer deception. Because of this, the American
public is entitled to factually accurate information about the health
consequences of smoking. For these reasons, it may be hard to accept this
Note’s conclusions regarding the application of the law. Nevertheless, the
government’s means of warning the public of smoking’s dangers and
encouraging Americans not to smoke must be balanced with respect for the
fundamental freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, this Note supports an analytical framework that
subjects the labels to strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies.
Using this framework, the graphic labels do not fall within the Zauderer
exception, and they must be examined under strict scrutiny. The labels fail
to meet this standard because the government’s interest is not compelling,
the labels are not narrowly tailored, and less burdensome restrictions are
available. Consequently, the TCA’s graphic cigarette warning labels are
unconstitutional compulsions of commercial speech.

